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I. Introduction
One major advantage of floating exchange rates was supposed to be the possibility of discretionary monetary policy to respond to domestic needs. But discretionary monetary policy has less often been used successfully and more often abused, convincing some to return to a fixed exchange rate, or other rigid rule for monetary policy.
1 Another major advantage of floating exchange rates was supposed to be automatic adjustment to terms of trade shocks. This has worked sometimes -a currency depreciating in response to a worsening of the world market in the country's export commodity. But there have also been other, more extraneous, movements in floating exchange rates that appear unrelated to trade shocks or other observable fundamentals. They have provided another argument for giving up on exchange rate flexibility.
Unfortunately, fixed exchange rates have had their own problems. The major argument that economists have for the last two decades been making in favor of currency pegs is a credible commitment to fight inflation, a way of addressing the problem of dynamic inconsistency in monetary policy. But pegs have been implicated in most of the crises in emerging markets in the last ten years. Almost all the victims of balance of payments cris es have found it necessary to devalue and move to more flexible arrangements.
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Adjusting to terms of trade shocks for emerging markets is as important now as it has ever been. In theory, access to international capital markets should help smooth fluctuations in trade. In practice, capital has fled from emerging markets in the 1 The advantages of a rule are demonstrated in Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogoff (1987) aftermaths of downturns in the world markets for their export commodities. A deterioration in export revenue, particularly measured in terms of the dollar, the currency in which most of their international debts are denominated, preceded the international debt crisis of 1982 as well as the crises in Thailand, Korea, Indonesia and other Asian countries in 1997. For our purposes, it does not matter whether the withdrawal of capital can be explained by economic fundamentals or not. Each of these countries, cut off from foreign money, was forced to achieve a substantial increase in net exports in a short period of time.
This study proposes a new monetary regime: a country can peg the price of its export commodity. We argue that such a regime can deliver the best of both worlds: it combines the inflation-fighting advantages of a nominal anchor with the advantage of automatic adjustment to terms of trade shocks. After explaining the motivation for the proposal, we simulate for a number of countries what its effect would have been over the last 30 years, compared to four alternative regimes: dollar peg, yen peg, euro or DM peg, and whatever exchange rate policy the country in question actually followed.
Each candidate for nominal anchor has its own vulnerability
Each of the various magnitudes that are candidates for nominal anchor has its own characteristic sort of extraneous fluctuations that can wreck havoc on a country's monetary system.
?? Under a monetarist rule, the central bank pegs the rate of growth of M1 at, say, 3% a year (plus or minus a margin of error). The Achilles heel of this rule is fluctuations in the public's demand for money or in the behavior of the banking system, which can directly produce gratuitous fluctuations in velocity and thereby in the real economy. For example, in the United States, a large upward shift in the demand for money around 1982 convinced the Federal Reserve Board that it had better abandon the mone y growth rule it had adopted two years earlier, or else face a prolonged and severe recession.
?? The novel idea of pegging the currency to the price of the export good, which this study puts forward, may sound similar to the current fashion of targeting the inflation rate or price level. was associated with a mid-century increase in liquidity and a resulting increase in the global price level. The absence of major discoveries of gold between 1873 and 1896 helps explain why price levels fell dramatically over this period (53 percent in the United States and 45 percent in the United Kingdom), inflicting hardship, for example, on American farmers. In the late 1890s, the gold rushes in Alaska and South Africa were each followed by new 4 Velocity shocks argue for the superiority of nominal income targeting over a monetarist rule. E.g., Frankel (1995) demonstrates the point mathematically, and gives other references on nominal income targeting. One could apply this same theoretical apparatus, taken from Rogoff (1985) , to demonstrate the conditions under which fixing the price of the export commodity would be superior to alternatives such as fixing the CPI.
upswings in the price level of similar magnitude. Thus the system did not in fact guarantee price stability.
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?? One proposal is that monetary policy should target a basket of basic mineral and agricultural commodities. The idea is that a broad-based commodity standard of this sort would not be subject to the vicissitudes of a single commodity such as gold, because fluctuations of its components would average out somewhat. 6 If the basket reflected the commodities produced and exported by the country in question, the proposal could work well. But for a country that is a net importer of oil, wheat, and other mineral and agricultural commodities, such a peg gives precisely the wrong answer in a year when the prices of these import commodities go up. Just when the domestic currency should be depreciating to accommodate an adverse movement in the terms of trade, it appreciates instead. Korea, for example, should not peg to a basket that includes grain or oil.
?? Under a fixed exchange rate, fluctuations in the value of the particular currency to which the home country is pegged can produce needless volatility in the country's international price competitiveness. For example, the appreciation of the dollar from 1995 and 2001 was also an appreciation for 5 Cooper (1985) or Hall (1982) .
6 A "commodity standard" was proposed in the 1930s -by B. Graham (1937) -and subsequently discussed by F. Graham (1941) , Keynes (1938) , and others. It was revived in the 1980s, as a less narrow version of proposals to return to a gold standard -e.g., Hall (1982) .
whatever currencies were linked to the dollar despite the absence of any necessary connection to the fundamentals of the smaller dollar-linked economies. The problem was particularly severe for some far-flung economies that had adopted currency boards over the preceding decade: Hong Kong, Argentina, and Lithuania. Dollar-induced overvaluation was also one of the problems facing such victims of currency crisis as Mexico (1994) , Thailand and Korea (1997) , Russia (1998 ), Brazil (1999 and Turkey (2001) , even though none of these countries had formal rigid links to the dollar, and indeed only Thailand had had a peg to the dollar in the two years preceding the crisis even in de facto terms. It is enough for the dollar to exert a large pull on the country's currency (relative to the weight of the United States in the country's exports) to create strains. The loss of competitiveness in non-dollar export markets adversely impacts such measures of economic health as real overvaluation, exports, the trade balance, and growth, or such measures of financial health as the ratios of current account to GDP, debt to GDP, debt service to exports, or reserves to imports.
To recap, each of the most popular variables that have been proposed as candidates for nominal anchors is subject to fluctuations that will add an element of unnecessary monetary volatility to a country that has pegged its money to that variable:
velocity shocks in the case of M1, supply or import shocks in the case of inflation targeting, measurement problems in the case of nominal income targeting, fluctuations in world gold markets in the case of the gold standard, and fluctuations in the anchor currency in the case of exchange rate pegs.
The proposal to target the price of the export commodity
This study argues that for those small countries that want a nominal anchor, a peg to their export commodity may make mo re sense than the alternatives. The argument is that such a peg would deliver the best of both worlds: the anchor of a peg and the accommodation of a float. The automatic accommodation or insulation that is normally thought to be the promise held out only by floating exchange rates is instead delivered per force by the pegging option. For any country that happens to be concentrated in the production of a particular agricultural or mineral commodity, that is the commodity the price of which would be fixed in domestic currency. Mali might peg to gold, Chile to copper, Indonesia to oil, Ethiopia to coffee, Argentina to a basket of agricultural commodity prices, and Korea to an index of consumer electronics prices.
A profit-maximizing firm that is competitive in its product and input markets will produce in relation to the ratio of the price of the export good to the price of its variable inputs. If its production is for simplicity taken to be Cobb-Douglas, with labor the only Under a hypothetical yen peg, We use the CPI to measure the price of variable inputs, w. When the currency is hypothetically taken to be rigidly pegged to the dollar, yen, or DM, CPI Home is taken to be the CPI of the US, Japan, or Germany or Japan, respectively, under the assumption that the peg is strong enough and permanent enough to achieve convergenc e of inflation rates. 11 The path of the real price of commodities under the five possible regimes is calculated as follows:
Under actual history,
Under a hypothetical dollar peg,
Under a hypothetical yen peg,
Under a hypothetical DM or euro peg,
Under a hypothetical commodity peg,
where K $ , K Y , K DM , and K x are constants calculated so as to make the log of the real price of the commodity on average over the 30 year period equal under each of the regimes to what it was in actual history.
Under each of the four hypothetical regimes, the path of exports is assumed to deviate from the actual history path in simple proportion to the deviation of the hypothetical real price from the historical real price. (This is the assumption of that the supply elasticity is unity.) The percentage deviation relative to actual history is given as follows:
S(DM/$) in 2000 = S(DM/$) in 1999 ?
(1 + % change of the euro exchange rate) 11 When calculating the real exchange rate for the euro, we continue to use the German CPI.
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The left linked to the mark, as opposed to the dollar, because the dollar appreciated against the mark. The decline in the price of gold in terms of the yen or mark was again more moderate during 1996-2000 than in terms of the dollar, when those currencies weakened against the dollar. But by then the New Guinea currency was free, and depreciating. As a result, the local price of gold did not fall in the late 1990s, but instead rose substantially.
Regardless the currency in terms of which the price of gold is expressed, it can be misleading to focus solely on the nominal price. Movements in the real price of gold are more important. They determine whether resources (meaning, in particular, capital and labor) inside the gold exporting country have an incentive to shift into the production of gold from other activities, or in the opposite direction. The rising price of gold in New Guinea in the late 1990s to some extent reflected a general inflation in the economy. To that extent, it did not provide a particular incentive for resources to shift into gold production, because wages and prices in other sectors were rising as well. The same is true of South Africa throughout the 1980s and 90s. Figure 1a shows that the nominal price of gold in terms of South African rand continued to rise in those two decades, even though the trend was down if the value of gold was measured in other terms. If our goal is to evaluate the implications of alternative monetary regimes for international price competitiveness and international debt, we should focus on the real price of gold. That is, we should deflate by the general price level in the country in question.
We simulate the real price of gold for the same set of countries. The right panel of The exchange rate path actually followed by South Africa, illustrated in Figure   1b , looks better now; the real price of gold in the 1990s more stable than would have occurred if the rand had been pegged to a major currency. The real price did not decline in 1994-95 as it would if the rand had been pegged to the (appreciating) yen or mark, nor did it decline as much in 1996-2000 as it would have if the South African currency had been more tightly linked to the (appreciating) dollar. Similarly, the real price of gold experienced by Burundi throughout this period was considerably more stable than it would have been if the currency had been pegged to a major currency. Of eight countries, Ghana stands out in that the real price of gold was more variable than it would been if the currency (the cedi) had been pegged to any of the major currencies (experiencing large declines in the mid-1970s and early 1980s, and a large increase during 1982-87).
Again, if any of these countries had had the stabilization of the price of gold as their overriding objective, they could have sought to peg it through monetary policy. But a fair comparison of the gold peg to the currency pegs will have to wait for the analysis of implications for exports and other economic variables below.
Oil prices
Next we look at seven major oil exporters. In each, oil exports are a high percentage of goods exports (Nigeria 95%, Venezuela 53%, Ecuador 46%, Cameroon 34%, Indonesia 32%, Mexico 31% and Russia 18%; these ratios are averages over the period). Given so many oil exporters to choose from, we have concentrated on those that have had international debt problems. Thus we have omitted some where oil constitutes more than 70% of goods exports (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Gabon, Iran, Oman), or more than 40% of GDP (Brunei, Qatar, and UAE), but that are mostly creditors rather than debtors.
The nominal price of oil tells a general story similar to the price of gold: sharp increases in 1974 and 1979, followed by declines in 1986 and 1998, and a pattern whereby the movements in terms of marks are a little less pronounced than the movements in terms of dollars. It is interesting that the volatility is so high when the oil price is expressed in terms of dollars, because OPEC supposedly sets the price in terms of dollars. Certainly oil is indeed invoiced in dollars. But the implication of these statistics is that OPEC in fact does not succeed in stabilizing the price in terms of dollars on a yearly basis.
Many of these oil-exporting countries experienced occasional jumps in the domestic price of oil when they devalued, which they would not have experienced if their currencies had remained pegged: Nigeria in 1999, Indonesia in 1998, and Russia in the early 1990s and again in 1999. On the other hand, the Indonesian rupiah and Ecuadorian sucre, for example, appreciated against the dollar in 1980; the result is that they experienced a smaller increase in the price of oil than they would have if they had pegged to a major currency. For each of the seven oil-exporting countries the domestic nominal price of oil would have been much less variable if they had been pegged to one of the three major currencies. Needless to repeat, the variability would have been lower still if they had sought as a matter of deliberate policy to stabilize the value of their currency in terms of oil.
Some of these countries experienced substantial inflation: Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico in the 1980s, Russia in the early 1990s, and Nigeria increasingly over time.
Again, the conversion from nominal to real is necessary. A look at the real price of oil shows that the world market declines of 1986 and 1998 fully reversed the real price increases of 1974 and 1979.
Nigeria's erratic monetary history is evident; it would have experienced a more stable price of oil if it had pegged its currency to either the dollar, yen or mark. The fall in world oil prices in 1998 hit Nigeria hard, contributing to its dire international position, which in turn produced a collapse in the currency and much higher local-currency oil price the subsequent year. The other oil exporters as well would have shown lower variability in the local price of oil if they had followed a currency peg, though little difference in variability of the real price.
Prices of other minerals
The 5 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 The list of countries specialized in coffee is long, and they rival the oil producers for concentration relative to exports or GDP. We focus on a set of thirteen: the five Central American countries, three in South America (Brazil, Colombia, and Peru) and five in Africa (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, Cameroon and Madagascar). All have coffee exports that exceed 4 per cent of goods exports, or 3 percent of total goods and services exports. Ethiopia is the leader, at 65 % of goods exports, followed by four of the Central American countries at 19-25 % of goods exports.
Nicaragua is the conspicuous hyperinflater in the group (1980s), though Brazil also qualified. Even in real terms, and even if the anomalous year of 1973 is excluded, Nicaragua would have had a more stable local real price of coffee if it had pegged to one of the major currencies. Most of the others, however, would have experienced variability in the local real price of coffee if they had pegged that was greater than, or similar to, what they actually experienced.
Implications of Alternative Currency Pegs for Export Quantities
We have seen what would have happened to the price of the principal export commodity under alternative pegs. But it would be desirable to go beyond that straightforward analysis. The relevant objective is not so simple as just minimizing variability in the real exchange rate. Rather, countries seek to maximize the long-run growth rate, avoid financial crashes, etc. If the goal were simply to minimize the variability in the price of gold or oil, then pegging the currency to the price of gold or oil would automatically be the right answer. While we wish to consider this regime, we don't want to pre-judge its merits. It might be desirable to have some variability in the real price of the export commodity, if the price increases came during periods when the country most needed boosts to export revenue, e.g., to service debt.
Suppose we are willing to make some crude assumptions about the behavior of exports and output, particularly with regard to price elasticities. Then we can simulate what the path of the economy's international sector might have looked like with alternative exchange rates and prices, e.g., what would have happened if the country had been pegged to the dollar or to gold throughout the period, as opposed to following whatever exchange rate path it actually followed. We can simulate paths for exports, the trade balance, debt, debt service requirements, and reserves.
Our crude assumption will be that (1) for every one percent real depreciation of the local currency against major world currencies and commodities, exports in terms of dollars (or other major currencies) would have risen by one percent in that same year, and (2) GDP in terms of dollars would have been unchanged. The assumption that exports would have risen proportionately could be interpreted as arising from two premises: that the price of the exportable good is determined in terms of foreign currency (which seems the appropriate model at least for small countries that produce mineral or agricultural products 12 ), and that the local elasticity of supply is one. This assumption is conservative in that it omits any effect whereby local residents respond to an increase in price by consuming less tradable goods and thereby leaving more for export (which is not unrealistic in the case of exports like gold or coffee where local consumption is relatively small, but is unrealistic for other products such as wheat and beef). It would be fairly easy to relax these assumptions. The second assumption, that GDP would be unchanged in dollar terms, is roughly justified by the logic of two offsetting considerations: the stimulus to export competitiveness would likely raise GDP in local terms, while the change in the exchange rate means that each unit of local output would translate into fewer dollars. If devaluations have contractionary effects on demand, this assumption might understate the increase in the export/GDP ratio. On the other hand, if there is a large positive Keynesian multiplier from exports to GDP, then our calculation might overstate the increase in the export/GDP ratio.
Specifically, the path of the real price of commodities under the five possible regimes is calculated as follows:
Under each of the four hypothetical regimes, the path of exports is assumed to deviate from the actual history path in simple proportion to the deviation of the hypothetical real price from the historical real price. The percentage deviation relative to actual history is given by the following:
We assume that the real depreciation of the currency will lead to the same percentage increase in exports. The hypothetical export can thus be calculated as:
? ? where X is export, and GDP is actual GDP of the respective year. (This is the assumption that the supply elasticity is unity.)
Our primary interest is not in a comprehensive comparison of the path that the economy would have followed if pegged to the dollar with the actual path. To do so would leave out important considerations such as, on the one hand, the inflation-fighting benefits of pre-commitment to a dollar peg, and, on the other hand, the potentially stabilizing benefits of a discretionary monetary policy when the exchange rate is flexible.
Our primary interest, rather, is in comparing the dollar path with the path under a peg to gold or other candidates. We calculate, if the country had pegged to the yen instead of the dollar, what would have been the local currency price of commodities, and what would the effect on exports of movement in the local currency price of commodities. We do the same with a peg to the euro, represented during our historical period by the German mark. Then we see what would have happened to the exports of the commodityproducing country if the value of the domestic currency had been fixed in terms of that commodity, rather than in terms of a major currency. In each case, we calculate differences relative to a baseline of the actual path of exports, so as to allow fluctuations in the myriad other factors that determine exports in addition to prices.
13
Gold exports
Burkino Faso's history shows a strong upward trend in exports from barely 6 percent of GDP in 1970 to more than twice that at times in the 1990s. Our discussion of 9 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
Oil exports
We turn next to oil producers. As already noted, rigid pegs to any external anchor would have eliminated the competitiveness gains that come from devaluation, such as the boosts to exports that were in fact experienced by Ecuador in 1999, Indonesia in 1998, Mexico in 1995, Nigeria in 1999 or Russia in 1998-99.
In the 1970s, many of the oil producers, such as Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, and Nigeria, would have experienced even bigger export booms than they did if they had been pegged to the dollar. A dollar peg would also have boosted the height of a plateau in Nigerian exports in 1996. A dollar peg for Mexico would ha ve produced a long upward trend that was smoother, but otherwise similar in magnitude to other pegs.
There are periodic proposals that Southeast Asian countries ought to give more weight to the yen than they have in the past. A yen peg for Indonesia would have resulted in the same export booms in 1974 and 1980, but would have given a smoother path during the period after oil prices stabilized at a lower level in 1986. In the critical year Of our two aluminum producers, Jamaica has over the three decades achieved more increases than decreases in exports, and Suriname the reverse. But both countries suffered a decline in their export ratios in 1993, for example, and a fall in the real price of aluminum may be part of the reason. These countries were sufficiently closely tied to the dollar over the period 1970-1983 that a rigid dollar peg would have made little difference. But subsequently, a dollar peg would have given a smoother export path to Jamaica. The catastrophic trough in exports that Suriname had hit by 1993 would have been postponed by one year if the country had been pegged to a major currency; but the low simulated export levels during 1994-1998 -a consequence of the inability to devalue -would have been poorly timed, in light of financial pressures in emerging markets.
Our platinum producer is South Africa. A peg to the price of platinum would have imposed substantial export troughs in 1979, 1988, 1994, and 1999, but substantial boosts in 1992 and 1998 .
Exports of two agricultural products
We now return to our three wheat-producers. Argentina's ratio of exports to GDP has long and famously been low. It has had a gradual upward trend, but with occasional severe downturns, particularly in 1975, 1980, and 1992 consequence of the fact that world agricultural prices were depressed in the latter part of the 1990s, especially in terms of dollars. It is perhaps not a coincidence that this was a period of crisis for Argentina, as agricultural products together make up a substantial share of its exports. This simulation seems to make a strong case for pegging to the price of the export commodity.
Australia is an interesting case, because it is a major exporter of agricultural and mineral products, and follows a floating exchange rate that is often justified as a useful mechanism for accommodating terms of trade shocks. For example, it has been claimed that Australia was spared the worst of the East Asian crisis because its currency automatically depreciated along with world market conditions for its exports, and it has even been proposed that countries like Argentina should use the Australian dollar as an anchor because it is a proxy for commodity prices. Our simulation suggests that 
III. Conclusion
The array of countries, commodities and currencies studied here is too diverse to allow a succinct summary of the export results. But it may be instructive to consider a cross-section of experiences in the late 1990s, a time of global financial pressures.
Whatever the degree of exchange rate flexibility with which our countries entered this period, most gave more weight to the dollar than to other possible anchors. As a result, the appreciation of the dollar in the late 1990s added to their difficulties. During this period, a link to the DM/euro or yen would have done better. But that is largely coincidence. More interesting is what would have happened if they had pegged to the price of their leading mineral or agricultural export commodity. Because the prices of aluminum, coffee, copper, gold, oil, and wheat were depressed in the late 1990s, a peg to these commodity prices would have enhanced competitiveness. If the countries that were specialized in the production of these commodities had pegged their currencies to those prices, they would have boosted their exports at just the right time, when they needed to improve their trade balances and debt/export ratios. This result is not entirely coincidence, in that weak commodity prices, especially in terms of dollars, were an important component of the 1997-99 wave of crises in emerging markets, as it had also been in the international debt crisis of 1982.
[We have also simulated the implications of the alternative regimes for current accounts and debt/export ratios. As examples, Figure   4a shows the current account results for copper-exporter Chile and Figure 4b for 
b. Debt/Export for Oil Producer Nigeria
Not all countries will benefit from a peg to their export commodity, and none will benefit in all time periods. One must go through the welter of simulation results developed in this paper to get a feeling for the variety of outcomes that is possible.
Nonetheless, the results are suggestive. What they suggest is that, especially for countries specialized in a mineral or agricultural export commodity, the proposal that they peg their currency to their export commodity deserves to take its place alongside pegs to major currencies and the list of other monetary regimes available for countries to consider. On http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~.jfrankel.academic.ksg/counterfactual/rank_price.html can be found more comprehensive sets of tables and figures I though V, including technical appendices. Table Set I 
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